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Population, Labour Force, and Long-Term Economic Growth
The Canadian population is aging as the children of the “baby boom” move into and through middle
age and then on toward the retirement years.  The “baby bust” that followed the boom has slowed
the rate of population growth and reduced sharply the supply of young people entering the labour
force.  The rates of participation of women in the labour force are now approaching those of men
and little can be expected in the way of continuing further growth from that source.  Immigration
has thus taken on an important role in determining the rates of population and labour force growth.
We explore these and related issues and draw out their implications for Canada’s economic growth
prospects.* Christine Feaver carried out the calculations for this paper and prepared the tables and figures.
The work on which the paper is based was supported by a grant from Health Canada under the
terms of its Seniors' Independence Research Program.  The paper draws heavily on material in
Denton, Feaver, and Spencer (1997b) and Denton and Spencer (1998); a modified version will
appear in Policy Options.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Fundamental long-run changes are underway in the Canadian population -- changes that will
have important and far-reaching consequences for the economy, and for the society at large.  The
population is slowly aging (in a collective sense) as the children of the "baby boom" move into and
through middle age, and then on towards the retirement years.  The "baby bust" that followed the
boom has slowed the rate of population growth and reduced sharply the supply of young people
entering the labour force.  The rates of participation of women in the labour force are now
approaching those of men and little can be expected in the way of continuing further growth from
that source; indeed, in recent years the increases of women's rates have been offset by sharp declines
in male rates at the older working ages.  Against this background, immigration has taken on an
important role in determining the rates of population and labour force growth, and its role in that
regard will almost certainly continue far into the future.  We explore these and related issues in what
follows, and draw out their implications for Canada's economic growth prospects.2
2.  THE AGING OF THE POPULATION
The root cause of population aging lies in the history of fertility.  The total fertility rate was three
children per woman or higher from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, and almost four during the late
1950s.
1  As boom gave way to bust it then fell rapidly, and by 1972 it had dropped below 2.1, the
level required for the population to replace itself naturally in the long run.  The rate has remained
below that level for the past quarter-century.  In 1995 (the latest year for which a figure is available)
it was a little more than 1.6.  The annual series of rates is displayed in Figure 1.  
The median age of the population fell during the baby boom, and then started to rise as fertility
rates declined and the children of the boom years moved on into adulthood.  The median age was
about 25 in 1966.  By 1996 it had risen to 35, and our projections suggest that over the next four
decades it may increase by another ten years.
Again, in 1966 more than 40 percent of the population were under the age of 20; by 1996 the
proportion was 27 percent, and falling.  At the other end of the age spectrum, the population aged
65 and over represented only 8 percent of the total as late as the early 1970s; by 1996 its share had
moved above 12 percent, and was continuing to rise.
The population medians and percentage distributions are recorded in Table 1 at five-year
intervals, from 1951 to 1996.  They leave no doubt as to the slow but relentless trend towards an
older population.
3.  THE SLOWING PACE OF LABOUR FORCE GROWTH
The rate of growth of the population declined in the 1960s and 1970s as fertility rates fell (Table
1).  Effects on the labour force were inevitable, of course, but they were delayed for two decades
or so, and the members of the baby boom generation were still moving into the job market as late
as the beginning of the 1980s.  The period of rapid growth came to an end quite abruptly at that3
point.  The labour force, which had grown by almost 18 percent between 1971 and 1976, and
another 17 percent between 1976 and 1981, increased by only 8.5 percent between 1981 and 1986
(Table 2).  By the 1990s the rate was cut in half again -- a little over 4 percent between 1991 and
1996.  Had it not been for the relatively high levels of immigration of recent years the rate would
have been much lower still.
4.  THE END OF THE ERA OF RISING LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES
The coming of working age of young people has not been the only source of postwar labour
force growth.  Immigration has been important in some periods (more on that below), and the
phenomenal rise in the labour force participation rates of women has been important too.
Annual average rates of labour force participation are shown in Figure 2 for men and women in
age groups from 15-19 to 65 and over, for the period 1951 to 1996.  The rates for women increased
greatly at all ages over that period, from the 20-24 age group up to the 55-64 group.  The rate for
women 25-34 rose from 24.9 percent to 77.6 percent, the rate for women 35-44 from 22.3 to 78.6,
and the rate for women 45-54 from 21.2 to 71.9.  Quite remarkable changes by any standard.
As the rates for women were rising the rates for men were declining.  For the most part the
declines were relatively modest when compared with the increases in the female rates.  In the age
groups 55-64 and 65 and over, though, they were quite substantial.  In 1951 about 87 percent of all
men in the 55-64 group were in the labour force; by 1996 the rate had dropped to only 59 percent.
The rising participation rates for women and the falling rates for men have sharply reduced the
male/female gaps.  At the youngest ages there is hardly any gap at all now; at ages above that the
female rates are still lower than the male rates but the differences are much less pronounced than
in earlier decades.  The scope for further narrowing seems quite limited.
The effects of these changes are reflected in the proportionate shares of women in the labour4
force.  Overall, women accounted for 45 percent of the Canadian labour force in 1996, compared
with only 23 percent in 1951.  The history of the percentage shares is provided in Figure 3, for broad
age groups and for the labour force as a whole.
The effects are reflected also in the changes that have occurred in the median age of women in
the labour force, compared with the corresponding median for men.  The two series of medians are
shown in Figure 4, and the convergence is striking.  In 1951 the median age was 29.0 for working
women, 37.6 for working men; in 1996 the medians were 37.1 and 37.8.
The rising rates of participation of women have been of great importance in the postwar
development of the labour force, and of great importance therefore for the economy.  But the era
seems to be over now.  Figure 2 suggests that the female rates have more or less levelled off.  Some
further increases are certainly possible, but so too are further decreases in male rates.  Overall, it
seems unlikely that changes in participation rates will be a source of much continuing growth in the
foreseeable future, and they may even be a source of decline.
5.  INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON IMMIGRATION
With inflows of young people into the labour force constrained by past low fertility and female
participation rates levelling off, immigration becomes the focus of attention.  Immigration has been
a highly volatile element in postwar population growth, ranging from a high of 282 thousand in 1957
to a low of 72 thousand in 1961.  Net immigration (the difference between incoming and outgoing
migrants) was overshadowed by natural increase (births minus deaths) from the 1950s through to
the mid-1980s.  In the past decade, though, the two have accounted for almost equal shares of
population growth:  between 1986 and 1996, net immigration accounted for 48 percent of the
increase in the Canadian population.  The percentage shares of natural increase and net immigration
are shown in Figure 5 for five-year intervals from 1951-56 to 1991-96.5
The contribution of net immigration to labour force growth has also varied.  In the early 1950s
more than half of the increase in the labour force was attributable to net immigration, which in no
small measure thus contributed to the rapid economic expansion of that period.  Its share then fell
sharply, and remained low until the latter part of the 1980s.  Between 1986 and 1991, though, its
share of total labour force growth was 46 percent, by our estimate, and between 1991 and 1996 it
was 71 percent.  In other words, seven-tenths of the increase in the Canadian work force in that most
recent five-year period is attributable to net immigration, only three-tenths to sources within the
Canadian population.  
The percentage shares over five-year intervals since 1951 are shown in Figure 6.  The figure
makes clear the extent to which labour force growth, and hence economic growth, have come to
depend on immigration in the past decade.  That dependence is likely to continue for a very long
time.
6.  SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE THE 1950s
The rate of growth of the national output, as represented by the real gross domestic product, can
be decomposed into several components.  The decomposition is based on the identity GDP =
(GDP/E)(E/L)(L/N)N, or in per capita terms on GDP/N = (GDP/E)(E/L)(L/N), where E is
employment, L is the labour force, and N is the total population.  In either case, the annual growth
rate of the variable on the left side of the identity is (to a close approximation) equal to the sum of
the growth rates of the variables on the right side.  Annual average growth rates for the four decades
1956-66 to 1986-96 are shown in Table 3.  GDP/E is labour productivity, E/L the employment rate,
and L/N the population-wide labour force participation rate.
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Table 3 documents the well known declines in the rates of growth of output and output per capita
since the 1970s, and the much lower rates of increase in labour productivity.  (Between 1956 and6
1976 productivity increased at average rates in excess of two percent per year; since 1976 the rates
have been less than one percent.)  The effects of rising average unemployment rates since the 1960s
are evidenced by the negative contributions of E/L.  The effects of shifts in the age distribution of
the population and the rising, but decelerating, labour force participation rates of women are
reflected in the contributions of L/N -- greatest in the decade 1966-76, somewhat smaller in 1976-
86, and finally turning negative in 1986-96.
7. LOOKING AHEAD:  THE POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE OVER THE NEXT FOUR
DECADES
We offer five sets of projections of the Canadian population and labour force, from 1996 to
2036, based on five alternative sets of assumptions.  The first, which may be regarded as a
"standard" or "baseline" projection, makes what we refer to as "medium" assumptions.  The second
and third are based on "faster growth" and "slower growth" assumptions.  The final two are intended
to show the effects of different rates of immigration; they are based on "zero immigration" and "high
immigration" assumptions.  The following is a summary description of each set of assumptions;
more detail is provided in Denton, Feaver, and Spencer (1997b) and Denton and Spencer (1998).
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Medium:  The total fertility rate remains at its most recent observed (1995) level of 1.639
births per woman; age-specific mortality rates for men and women continue to decline, but
more slowly than in recent decades; gross immigration is 200,000 per year (close to the
average of the past decade).
Faster growth:  The total fertility rate increases to 2.1 (the long-run natural replacement
level) by 2006 and then remains there; age-specific mortality rates decline somewhat faster
than in the medium projections; gross immigration increases to 250,000 per year by 1999
and then remains at that level.7
Slower growth:  The total fertility rate decreases to 1.4 by 2006 and then remains there; age-
specific mortality rates decline somewhat more slowly than in the medium projections; gross
immigration decreases to 150,000 per year by 1999 and then remains at that level.
Zero immigration:  The same as the medium projections except that gross immigration is
zero in every year.
High immigration:  The same as the medium projections except that gross immigration is
400,000 in every year.
The population projections themselves are shown in Table 4, at ten-year intervals, and the labour
force projections in Table 5.
The ten-year population growth rate declines in every decade under the "medium" assumptions.
From 13.9 percent in 1986-96 it falls to 10.4 percent in 1996-06, 8.2 percent in 2006-16, 6.2 percent
in 2016-26, and finally 3.8 percent in 2026-36, or less than four-tenths of one percent per annum.
Even under the "faster growth" assumptions there is continuous downward movement in the growth
rate, although of course the decline is not as rapid; by 2026-36 the ten-year rate falls to 9.4 percent.
The "slower growth" assumptions produce much more rapid reductions:  by 2016-26 the population
grows by only 2.4 percent, and by 2026-36 it is actually decreasing.
The importance of immigration in determining the future rate of population growth is clear from
the final two projections in Table 4.  When immigration is eliminated entirely the population grows
by only 3.2 percent in the decade 1996-06, and as early as 2016-26 it stops growing altogether and
starts to decline.  If the "high immigration" assumption of 400,000 per year is invoked, on the other
hand, the rate of growth rises to 17.6 percent in 1996-06.  It falls thereafter, dropping to 9.0 percent
by 2026-36.  If Canadian fertility remains low the population will be increasingly dependent on
immigration for future growth.  But even 400,000 per year -- a very high level of immigration, by8
historical standards -- would be insufficient to keep the growth rate from declining.
The choice of assumptions has some effect on the age distribution of the population.  The
"medium" assumptions lead to a decrease in the proportion under 20 years of age, from 26.7 percent
in 1996 to 20.0 percent by the end of the projection period, and concomitantly an increase in the
proportion 65 and over, from 12.2 percent to 24.8 percent.  In reflection of the distributional shift,
the median age of the population rises from 35.2 to 45.0.  The trend toward an older population is
strengthened under the "slower growth" and "zero immigration" assumptions, weakened under the
"faster growth" and "high immigration" assumptions.  In no case though is it reversed.  Even the
"faster growth" assumptions, with their higher fertility levels, result in 22.6 percent of the population
being 65 and over by the end of the projection period, and a median age of 41.0.  Of particular note
is how little the age distribution is affected by altering the level of immigration:  at 200,000 per year
(the "medium" assumption) the proportion 65 and over is 24.8 percent by 2036, and the median age
is 45.0; at twice that level of immigration maintained over the forty-year projection period (the "high
immigration" assumption) the proportion 65 and over is 22.2 percent and the median age 43.4
percent.  Clearly the level of immigration is not a very effective policy instrument for influencing
the age distribution of the population; very large increases in immigration would be required to bring
about rather modest shifts in the proportion of older people.
The labour force projections are provided in Table 5.  The rate of growth of the labour force
declines only slightly in the decade 1996-06 under the "medium" assumptions, but then falls sharply,
and by the last two decades of the projection period it is approximately zero.  "Faster growth"
assumptions yield growth rates that are positive in every decade; higher fertility rates generate larger
inflows of young people into the labour force after two decades or so, and those combine with larger
inflows of immigrant workers, under the "faster growth" assumptions.  Nevertheless, even under9
those assumptions the labour force growth rate is low after 2006, by postwar historical standards.
The "slower growth" assumptions lead to virtually no growth by the decade 2006-16, and to declines
in the size of the labour force thereafter.  Again the dependence on immigration is apparent:
substantial reductions in the size of the labour force occur in every decade from 2006-16 on when
immigration is set to zero; at 400,000 immigrants per year the growth rates remain positive, although
they fall sharply after two decades.
Figures 7 and 8 combine projected and historical population and labour force series in the form
of five-year growth rates and show the rates as continuous series from 1951-56 to 2031-36.  The
projections are the "medium" ones.  The long-run downward trends in the two growth-rate series,
under the "medium" assumptions, stand out clearly in the figures.  Aside from 1986-91, the
population growth rate falls in every five-year period from the early 1950s; aside from 1996-01, the
labour force growth rate falls in every period from the 1970s until around 2016-21, from which point
on it is effectively zero.
A long-run picture of the changing age distribution of the population is provided in Figure 9 in
the form of a succession of population "pyramids" (to use a conventional term) at twenty-year
intervals from 1956 to 2036, based again on the "medium" assumptions for the projections.  The
sequence of Canadian pyramids is striking:  the age bulge created by the baby boom is seen to work
its way through the age distribution, first into the labour force entrance ages, then into middle age,
and finally into old age.  Even more striking, though, is the sequence for Newfoundland, which we
include as an extreme example of how the age distribution can be distorted by low fertility rates,
combined with outmigration.  From a traditional pyramidal shape in 1956, the distribution for
Canada takes on an increasingly rectangular appearance.  For Newfoundland, though, it comes to
look more like a child's top -- a very large proportion of old and middle-aged adults supported by10
a very small base of young people.
8.  PRODUCTIVITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE ECONOMIC GROWTH
Earlier we used the identities GDP = (GDP/E)(E/L)(L/N)N and GDP/N = (GDP/E)(E/L)(L/N)
as a basis for decomposing the rates of growth of real GDP and real GDP per capita into
components.  We now turn the identities around and use them to calculate the rates of growth of
labour productivity that would be required in the future to achieve selected GDP and per capita GDP
growth rates, given the alternative population and labour force projections.  To do that we require
one further assumption:  we assume (in all cases) that the annual average rate of unemployment will
move from 9.7 percent in 1996 to 9.0 percent by 2001, and then remain at that level.  (The
assumption is not particularly important; the long-run growth calculations are not very sensitive to
it.)  The results of the calculations are shown in Table 6.  To take an example, for illustration, under
the "medium" assumptions a rate of growth of 2 percent per annum in total real GDP would require
that labour productivity (GDP/E) increase by 0.85 percent per annum in the decade 1996-06, 1.55
percent in the decade 2006-16, 2.01 percent in the decade 2016-26, and 1.97 percent in the decade
2026-36.  Results are shown in the table for total GDP growth rates of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 percent and
for per capita GDP rates of 0, 1, 2, and 3 percent.
The GDP growth rate was a little under 5 percent per year from 1956 to 1976, fell to almost 3
percent in 1976-86, and then to 2 percent in 1986-96 (refer back to Table 3).  A 2 percent GDP
growth rate could be achieved between 1996 and 2006 with a productivity growth rate of 0.85
percent, under "medium" assumptions, and that would be virtually the same as the actual 1986-96
rate.  The total and per capita GDP growth rates could be maintained for another decade without
requiring any more rapid increase in the level of aggregate productivity if the medium projection
assumptions are more or less accurate.  But in order to sustain those rates in the subsequent decades11
productivity would have to increase at a faster pace.  Moreover, 1986-96 is perhaps not the best
benchmark to use; that was a decade of slow growth, by historical standards, and more rapid growth
might be hoped for in the future.  To raise the GDP per capita rate to 1 percent per year would
require substantially faster productivity gains after 2006; to raise it to 2 percent per year would
require much faster gains still -- gains even greater than those of the high-growth decades 1956-66
and 1966-76.
The required rates of productivity increase are of course affected by the population and labour
force projection assumptions.  The requirements to sustain the different rates of total GDP growth
vary considerably from one set of projections to another.  But the requirements to sustain the rates
of growth of per capita GDP vary much less; they are relatively insensitive to the assumptions.  The
reason, broadly put, is that differences in the projection assumptions affect both total GDP (through
effects on the size of the labour force) and the population, so that GDP/N is much less sensitive to
the choice of assumptions than is GDP alone.
Whether the productivity requirements for total GDP or per capita GDP are the more important
ones depends on which issues are being considered.  GDP per capita is clearly the more natural
measure of economic welfare (albeit a crude one).  But total GDP is an important measure from the
point of view of the national debt -- the future debt-to-GDP ratio, in particular.  If attention is
focussed on the growth of total GDP, then the differences among the projections are very important;
if attention is focussed on the growth of per capita GDP they are much less important.
Immigration is likely to be the one potent demographic control instrument available to the
Canadian Government.  While immigration may be rather ineffective as a means of altering the age
distribution, and slowing the rate of population aging, it obviously can be very effective in
increasing the size of the labour force, hence aggregate GDP, and hence the debt-to-GDP ratio.12
(That is not to recommend for or against its use for that purpose, merely to point out the
relationship.)
9.  CONCLUSION
The Canadian population is aging, in a collective sense.  The proportion of people 65 and over
has been rising in the past three decades and is projected roughly to double in the next four.  The
median age has risen from 25 to 35 and is projected to rise by perhaps another ten years over the
same period.  The rate of growth of the population has declined, in consequence of low fertility
rates, and further declines are anticipated if immigration continues at recent levels.  The rate of
growth of the labour force has declined also; the inflow of young people into the labour force has
been severely restricted by the past low fertility rates and the participation rates of women have
started to level off.  The economy is now very largely dependent on immigration for labour force
growth, and that situation is likely to continue far into the future.
Immigration appears to be the only effective instrument at the national level for controlling
population and labour force growth in the next few decades.  Population aging seems inevitable;
even very high rates of immigration are unlikely to have much effect in that regard.  But the size and
rate of growth of the population and labour force can obviously be altered substantially by allowing
more or fewer people into the country.
The rate of growth of real GDP per capita has been low during the past decade, by previous
postwar standards.  It could be maintained and even increased somewhat during the next decade if
national productivity were to rise at about the same pace as in the past one.  Beyond that, though,
more rapid increases in productivity would be required to offset anticipated demographic changes,
and they would be required even sooner if the relatively slow growth of per capita GDP of recent
years were to be replaced by more rapid growth over the next decade.13
We have presented five sets of population and labour force projections, based on five different
sets of assumptions.  The rates of increase in national productivity required to keep GDP per capita
growing at any given rate do not vary greatly from one set to another, the implication being that the
per capita GDP growth rate is not very sensitive to the choice of demographic assumptions.
However, there is considerable variation in the rates of productivity increase required to keep total
GDP growing at any chosen rate.  The rate of growth of total GDP is linked closely to the rate of
growth of the labour force, and that in turn is linked closely to the level of immigration.  From the
point of view of the management of the national debt, that raises the possibility of using immigration
as an instrument for increasing total GDP, and hence reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.  We take no
position on whether such a course would be desirable but simply point out the possibility.14
1. The total fertility rate is interpreted as the number of liveborn children that would be born
per woman over the childbearing age range if the age-specific rates (numbers of births per
woman at particular ages) did not change.  Because the total fertility rate for a given year is
calculated using only data for that year it is known in demography as a period rate, as
distinguished from a cohort rate, which would be based on data for successive years to
reflect the fact that age-specific rates may vary as a cohort of women ages.
2. It is convenient to think of the growth of GDP/E as a measure of productivity increase but
one should keep in mind that it is the net result of a number of factors, including changes in
average hours of work, changes in the capital/labour ratio, changes in the educational and
skill composition of the labour force, increases in aggregate returns to scale, changes in
technology, and others.  It is convenient too to think of L/N as an overall labour force
participation rate but that is not a conventional definition; the Statistics Canada Labour Force
Survey would exclude from the denominator the population under the age of 15 and some
other components of the population.
3. The projections were generated using the MEDS projection/simulation program described
in Denton, Feaver, and Spencer (1994, 1997a).
FOOTNOTES15
REFERENCES
Denton, Frank T., Christine H. Feaver, and Byron G. Spencer (1994), "Economic-Demographic
Projection and Simulation:  A Description of the MEDS System of Models," in K. Vaninadha
Rao and Jerry W. Wicks (eds.), Studies in Applied Demography:  Proceedings of the
International Conference on Applied Demography, Population and Society Research Center,
Bowling Green State University.
Denton, Frank T., Christine H. Feaver, and Byron G. Spencer (1997a), "PMEDS-D Users' Manual,"
Research Report No. 326, Research Institute for Quantitative Studies in Economics and
Population, McMaster University.
Denton, Frank T., Christine H. Feaver, and Byron G. Spencer (1997b), "Immigration, Labour Force,
and the Age Structure of the Population," Research Report No. 335, Research Institute for
Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population, McMaster University.
Denton, Frank T. and Byron G. Spencer (1998), "Demographic Trends, Labour Force Participation,
and Long-Term Growth," in Thomas J. Courchene and Thomas A. Wilson (eds.), Fiscal








1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995


































































1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
15+





















1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
men
women
Figure 3: Women as a Percentage of the Labour Force, by Age Group, 1951-1996
Figure 4: Median Age of Labour Force, Men and Women, 1951-1996
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Figure 6: Percentage Share of Labour Force Growth, 1951-56 to 1991-96
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Note: Projected growth rates, represented by the broken line, are based on “medium” assumptions.
Figure 8: Five-year Percentage Growth Rates: Labour Force, 1951-56 to 2031-36
Note: Projected growth rates, represented by the broken line, are based on “medium” assumptions.
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Note: The horizontal bars on each side of the vertical lines represent, for men and women, the percentages of the
total population in each five-year group from 0-4 to 85-89 and in the group 90 and over.  The projections
for 2016 and 2036 are based on “medium” assumptions.
Table 1:  The Population and Its Age Distribution, 1951-199622
Population Growth, previous 5 years Age distribution (%) Median
('000) ('000) (%) Under 20 20-64 65 and over Age
1951 14,333 -- -- 37.9 54.4 7.8 27.7
1956 16,448 2,115 14.8 39.7 52.5 7.7 27.2
1961 18,639 2,191 13.3 41.8 50.6 7.6 26.3
1966 20,452 1,813 9.7 42.1 50.2 7.7 25.4
1971 22,026 1,575 7.7 39.1 52.9 8.0 26.2
1976 23,518 1,491 6.8 35.6 55.8 8.6 27.7
1981 24,900 1,383 5.9 31.8 58.6 9.6 29.5
1986 26,204 1,304 5.2 28.6 60.9 10.5 31.3
1991 28,120 1,916 7.3 27.5 61.0 11.4 33.2
1996 29,841 1,721 6.1 26.7 61.1 12.2 35.2
Table 2:  The Labour Force, 1951-1996
Labour force Growth, previous 5 years
('000) ('000) (%)
1951 5,563 -- --
1956 6,202 639 11.5
1961 6,983 781 12.6
1966 7,860 877 12.6
1971 9,030 1,170 14.9
1976 10,644 1,614 17.9
1981 12,451 1,807 17.0
1986 13,506 1,055 8.5
1991 14,540 1,034 7.7
1996 15,148 608 4.223
Table 3:  Decomposition of Growth of Real GDP into Labour-Related Sources:1956-66 to 1986-96
GDP N GDP/N GDP/E E/L L/N
--Annual average percentage change--
1956-66 4.68 2.20 2.42 2.23 0.00 0.19
1966-76 4.85 1.41 3.39 2.12 -0.40 1.65
1976-86 3.13 1.09 2.02 0.97 -0.26 1.31
1986-96 2.02 1.31 0.71 0.88 -0.02 -0.15
Note:  GDP -- real gross domestic product;  N -- population;  E -- employment;  L -- labour force.24
Table 4:  The Future Population:  Alternative Projections, 1996-2036
Population Growth, previous Age distribution (%) Median
('000) (index) 10 years Under 20 20-64 65 and age   
('000) (%) over
--"medium" assumptions--
1996 29,841 100.0 3,637 13.9 26.7 61.2 12.2 35.2
2006 32,945 110.4 3,104 10.4 24.2 62.5 13.3 38.9
2016 35,631 119.4 2,686 8.2 21.9 61.5 16.6 41.4
2026 37,848 126.8 2,217 6.2 20.8 57.7 21.5 43.3
2036 39,293 131.7 1,445 3.8 20.0 55.1 24.8 45.0
--"faster growth" assumptions--
1996 29,841 100.0 3,637 13.9 26.7 61.2 12.2 35.2
2006 33,916 113.7 4,075 13.7 25.3 61.6 13.1 38.2
2016 38,365 128.6 4,449 13.1 25.2 59.0 15.9 39.6
2026 42,612 142.8 4,247 11.1 24.9 55.0 20.1 40.6
2036 46,635 156.3 4,023 9.4 24.3 53.1 22.6 41.0
--"slower growth" assumptions--
1996 29,841 100.0 3,637 13.9 26.7 61.2 12.2 35.2
2006 32,227 108.0 2,386 8.0 23.5 63.0 13.5 39.3
2016 33,690 112.9 1,463 4.5 19.9 63.0 17.1 42.5
2026 34,492 115.6 802 2.4 18.5 59.2 22.3 44.9
2036 34,238 114.7 -254 -0.7 17.7 56.4 25.9 47.0
--"zero immigration" assumptions--
1996 29,841 100.0 3,637 13.9 26.7 61.1 12.2 35.2
2006 30,793 103.2 952 3.2 23.8 62.3 13.9 39.9
2016 31,089 104.2 296 1.0 21.0 60.9 18.1 43.3
2026 30,795 103.2 -294 -0.9 19.7 55.7 24.6 45.8
2036 29,642 99.3 -1,153 -3.7 18.7 52.2 29.1 48.0
--"high immigration" assumptions--
1996 29,841 100.0 3,637 13.9 26.7 61.1 12.2 35.2
2006 35,096 117.6 5,255 17.6 24.4 62.7 12.8 38.1
2016 40,172 134.6 5,076 14.5 22.5 62.0 15.5 40.1
2026 44,900 150.5 4,728 11.8 21.6 58.9 19.4 41.8
2036 48,943 164.0 4,043 9.0 20.8 56.9 22.2 43.4
Note:  See text for a description of the assumptions underlying each projection.25
Table 5:  The Future Labour Force:  Alternative Projections, 1996-2036
Labour force Growth, previous
('000) (index) 10 years
('000) (%)
--"medium" assumptions--
1996 15,148 100.0 1,642 12.2
2006 16,831 111.1 1,683 11.1
2016 17,589 116.1 758 4.5
2026 17,567 116.0 -22 -0.1
2036 17,615 116.3 48 0.3
--"faster growth" assumptions--
1996 15,148 100.0 1,642 12.2
2006 17,729 117.0 2,581 17.0
2016 19,219 126.9 1,490 8.4
2026 20,214 133.4 995 5.2
2036 21,537 142.2 1,323 6.5
--"slower growth" assumptions--
1996 15,148 100.0 1,642 12.2
2006 16,013 105.7 865 5.7
2016 16,051 106.0 38 0.2
2026 15,391 101.6 -660 -4.1
2036 14,704 97.1 -687 -4.5
--"zero immigration" assumptions--
1996 15,148 100.0 1,642 12.2
2006 15,625 103.1 477 3.1
2016 15,059 99.4 -566 -3.6
2026 13,709 90.5 -1,350 -9.0
2036 12,566 83.0 -1,143 -8.3
--"high immigration" assumptions--
1996 15,148 100.0 1,642 12.2
2006 18,037 119.1 2,889 19.1
2016 20,119 132.8 2,082 11.5
2026 21,425 141.4 1,306 6.5
2036 22,664 149.6 1,239 5.8
Note:  See text for a description of the assumptions underlying each projection.26
Table 6:  Average Annual Labour Productivity (GDP/E) Increases Required to Achieve Specified Rates of GDP
                  and GDP per Capita (GDP/N) Growth:  Alternative Projections, 1996-06 to  2026-36
To achieve GDP growth rate of-- To achieve GDP/N growth rate of--
0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%
 
Required % increase in GDP/E
--"medium" assumptions--
1996-06 -1.12 -0.14 0.85 1.84 2.83 -0.14 0.86 1.86 2.85
2006-16 -0.44 0.56 1.55 2.55 3.54 0.34 1.35 2.35 3.35
2016-26 0.01 1.01 2.01 3.01 4.01 0.62 1.62 2.63 3.64
2026-36 -0.03 0.97 1.97 2.97 3.97 0.35 1.35 2.35 3.36
--"faster growth" assumptions--
1996-06 -1.64 -0.65 0.33 1.31 2.30 -0.37 0.63 1.62 2.62
2006-16 -0.80 0.19 1.18 2.17 3.16 0.43 1.43 2.44 3.44
2016-26 -0.50 0.49 1.49 2.48 3.48 0.55 1.55 2.56 3.56
2026-36 -0.63 0.36 1.35 2.35 3.34 0.27 1.27 2.27 3.28
--"slower growth" assumptions--
1996-06 -0.63 0.36 1.36 2.35 3.34 0.14 1.14 2.14 3.14
2006-16 -0.02 0.98 1.98 2.98 3.98 0.42 1.43 2.43 3.43
2016-26 0.42 1.42 2.43 3.43 4.44 0.66 1.66 2.67 3.68
2026-36 0.46 1.46 2.47 3.47 4.48 0.38 1.39 2.39 3.40
--"zero immigration" assumptions--
1996-06 -0.39 0.61 1.61 2.60 3.60 -0.07 0.93 1.92 2.92
2006-16 0.37 1.37 2.38 3.38 4.38 0.47 1.47 2.47 3.48
2016-26 0.94 1.95 2.96 3.97 4.98 0.85 1.86 2.87 3.87
2026-36 0.87 1.88 2.89 3.90 4.91 0.49 1.49 2.50 3.50
--"higher immigration" assumptions--
1996-06 -1.81 -0.83 0.16 1.14 2.12 -0.20 0.80 1.79 2.79
2006-16 -1.09 -0.10 0.89 1.88 2.87 0.26 1.26 2.26 3.27
2016-26 -0.63 0.37 1.36 2.36 3.35 0.49 1.49 2.50 3.50
2026-36 -0.56 0.43 1.43 2.42 3.42 0.30 1.30 2.31 3.3127
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